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On February 3, 2010, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued its judgment on the
appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) denying his application for an arrest
warrant against President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir in relation to the crime of genocide. Holding
that the PTC had applied an erroneous standard of proof, the Appeals Chamber reversed the PTC's decision and
directed it to reconsider whether the warrant should be issued in light of the Appeals Chamber's discussion of
the appropriate standard of proof.
The case against Al Bashir was initiated in July 2008, when the ICC Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant against
him on three counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and two counts of war crimes. The
request marked the first time the ICC was faced with the question of whether to issue an arrest warrant against
a sitting head of state. Not surprisingly, the case engendered considerable debate, particularly regarding whether
the genocide charges were warranted. On March 4, 2009, nearly eight months after the Prosecutor filed his request,
the PTC granted the Prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant in relation to war crimes (directing attacks against
civilians and pillage) and crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, and rape) committed
in connection with the counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur. However, it denied the arrest warrant application
in relation to the genocide charges.
The Appeals Chamber's decision focused on whether the PTC had properly interpreted Article 58(1)(a) of the
Rome Statute, which requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to grant the Prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant if
"[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court." Noting that the Prosecution had relied exclusively on "proof by inference" to substantiate its allegations
regarding Al Bashir's genocidal intent, the PTC held in its decision of March 4, 2009 that "if the existence
of .. . genocidal intent is only one of several reasonable conclusions on the materials provided by the Prosecution,
the Prosecution Application in relation to genocide must be rejected . . .."

In her dissent, Judge Anita Ugacka disagreed with the test adopted by the majority, noting that the Rome Statute
provides for "progressively higher evidentiary thresholds" 2 from the arrest warrant stage to conviction. Furthermore,
in her view, it would be sufficient at the arrest warrant stage for the inference of genocidal intent to be a reasonable
one rather than the only reasonable conclusion based on the evidence. 3
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber similarly distinguished between the evidentiary standard required for the
Court to issue an arrest warrant ("reasonable grounds to believe") and the higher standard required for confirmation
of charges ("substantial grounds to believe") and conviction ("beyond reasonable doubt"). It found that requiring
the Prosecution to show that the existence of genocidal intent is the only reasonable conclusion based on the
evidence amounts to requiring it to "establish[] genocidal intent 'beyond reasonable doubt."' 4 The Appeals
Chamber therefore reversed the PTC's decision not to issue an arrest warrant in relation to genocide. However,
it declined, without explanation, to determine whether an arrest warrant for the crime of genocide could be issued
under the correct standard of proof based on the factual findings made by the PTC, thereby denying the Prosecutor's
request that it direct the PTC to authorize the arrest of Al Bashir for the crime of genocide.
The Appeals Chamber decision raises a number of interesting issues. First, it highlights the importance of applying
the correct standard of proof to all types of evidence, including "proof by inference" or circumstantial evidence.
Genocide is notoriously difficult to prove because it requires the Prosecutor to show that perpetrators not only
targeted members of a protected group but that they did so specifically intending to destroy the group, in whole
or in part. Given the absence of smoking gun evidence of intent in most, if not all, contemporary situations where
genocide has been alleged,s the Chamber's clarification that the standard of proof applicable to each stage of
proceedings must be applied uniformly to all categories of evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is significant.
Second, the decision raises questions about the role of the ICC's Appeal Chamber, particularly its role with respect
to interlocutory appeals. Article 82 of the Rome Statute provides that parties may make appeals as of right with
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respect to decisions on jurisdiction or admissibility, decisions granting or denying release from custody, and
decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber to take measures for the preservation of evidence that it deems essential for
the defense at trial. All other interlocutory appeals may be made only with the permission of the Pre-Trial or
Trial Chamber that issued the impugned decision. Specifically, Article 82(1)(d) provides that a party may appeal:
a decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct
of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Pre-Trial or
Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially advance the
proceedings.
In the first several years of the Court's operations, the Pre-Trial Chambers took a narrow approach to interpreting
the provision governing discretionary interlocutory appellate review. 6 In the past couple of years, however, leave
has been granted on different occasions by different Chambers of the Court, permitting the Appeals Chamber to
make a number of significant rulings. For instance, in December of 2009, the Appeals Chamber ruled on the issue
of whether the Trial Chamber could use a regulation of the Court to legally recharacterize the facts in the case
against an accused.7 Although the Appeals Chamber noted that a Trial Chamber's recharacterization of the facts
is not inherently incompatible with the Rome Statute or general principles of international law,8 it clarified, among
other things, that it was the role of the Prosecutor rather than the Trial Chamber to present the charges against
the accused. 9
Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber's decision in Al Bashirseems to suggest that the Chamber views its supervisory
role as significantly limited. Indeed, although the Appeals Chamber had the power under the ICC's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence to decide whether to issue the arrest warrant against Al Bashir on the genocide charges,10
it refused to do so without explanation. Instead, it directed the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide on the matter. The
Appeals Chamber's refusal to make a determination regarding the genocide charges seems particularly problematic,
considering that it took the Pre-Trial Chamber nearly eight months to issue its original decision on the arrest
warrant application and the Appeals Chamber over seven months to hand down its decision relating to the genocide
charges. Moreover, the Trial Chamber has yet to issue its decision on the genocide charges. Indeed, it is now
nearly two years since the Prosecutor filed the original request for an arrest warrant. Meanwhile, Al Bashir remains
in power. In April of this year, he was declared the winner of Sudan's nationwide presidential elections, the first
since 1986.
It appears, therefore, that while the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers have granted leave to appeal on a more generous
basis than in the early years of the Court's operations, the Appeals Chamber has chosen to act with significant
restraint. This approach seems to suggest that even if leave to appeal is granted, the Appeals Chamber will not
necessarily engage in conclusively resolving unsettled issues. In light of the controversy triggered by Al Bashir,
the Chamber's preferred focus on the narrow issue of standard of proof, rather than whether the genocide charges
were warranted, evokes the question of whether its rulings will provide sufficient guidance when issues affecting
the legitimacy or credibility of the Court are raised.
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Delivers, the following
JUDGMENT
The "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir" is reversed to the extent that Pre-Trial Chamber I decided not to issue a warrant of arrest in
respect of the crime of genocide in view of an erroneous standard of proof. The Pre-Trial Chamber is
directed to decide anew, on the basis of the correct standard of proof, whether a warrant of arrest in respect
of the crime of genocide should be issued.
REASONS
I.

KEY FINDING

1.
A Pre-Trial Chamber acts erroneously if it denies to issue a warrant of arrest under article 58 (1) of the
Statute on the basis that "the existence of [...] genocidal intent is only one of several reasonable conclusions
available on the materials provided by the Prosecution".
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.

Proceedings Before the Pre-Trial Chamber

2.
On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor filed before Pre-Trial Chamber I an application 2 under article 58 of the
Statute, requesting the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir for his alleged
criminal responsibility in' the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against members
of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in Darfur from March 2003 to July 2008 (hereinafter: "Arrest Warrant
Application").
3.
On 4 March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber rendered the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir" 3 (hereinafter: "Impugned Decision"). The Pre-Trial
Chamber decided to issue an arrest warrant in respect of crimes against humanity and war crimes,4 but rejected
the Prosecutor's application in respect of the crime of genocide.5
4.
On 13 March 2009, the Prosecutor filed the "Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the 'Decision
on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir "'6 dated 10
March 2009 (hereinafter: "Application for Leave to Appeal"), requesting leave to appeal the Impugned Decision
in respect of three issues.
5.
On 24 June 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber rendered the "Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Leave
to Appeal the 'Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad
Al Bashir' 7 (hereinafter: "Decision Granting Leave to Appeal"), granting the Application for Leave to Appeal
in respect of one of the issues and rejecting the remainder of the application.8 The issue in respect of which leave
to appeal was granted reads as follows:
Whether the correct standard of proof in the context of Article 58 requires that the only reasonable
conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that
the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.9
B.

Proceedings on Appeal

6.
On 2 July 2009, the Prosecutor filed the "Prosecution Request for an Extension of the Page Limit for its
Document in Support of the Appeal against the 'Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir"' 10 , in which the Prosecutor requested an extension of the page limit for
his document in support of the appeal pursuant to regulation 37 (2) of the Regulations of the Court. The Appeals
Chamber granted the Prosecutor's request on 3 July 2009.11
7.
On 6 July 2009, the Prosecutor filed the "Prosecution Document in Support of Appeal against the 'Decision
on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir"' 12 (hereinafter:
"Document in Support of the Appeal").
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8.
On 20 July 2009, the Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (hereinafter: "SWTUF") and the Sudan
International Defence Group (hereinafter: "SIDG") filed an application for leave to make observations on the
appeal under rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter: "Application under Rule 103' ),13
which the Prosecutor opposed.14 On 18 September 2009, the Appeals Chamber granted the Application under
Rule 103.'1 The reasons for that decision were filed on 9 November 2009.16 On 25 September 2009, the SWTUF
and SIDG submitted their "Observations on behalf of Amici Curiae in respect of the Prosecution Appeal's [sic]
against 'Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir"' 17 (hereinafter: "Observations"). On 2 October 2009, the Prosecutor responded to the Observations18
(hereinafter: "Response to Observations").
On 27 August 2009, the applicants for victim status a/0443/09 to a/0450/09 (hereinafter: "Victims") filed
9.
the "Request for an Extension of the Time Limit Prescribed in the Regulations of the Court and Observations on
the Victims' Right to Participate in the Prosecution's Appeal against the Decision on the Application for a Warrant
for the Arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir".19 The Prosecutor responded to this filing on 4 September
2009.20 On 23 October 2009, the Appeals Chamber rendered the "Decision On the Applications by Victims a/
0443/09 to a/0450/09 to Participate in the Appeal against the 'Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir' and on the Request for an Extension of Time", 21
instructing the Registrar to transmit the applications of the Victims to Pre-Trial Chamber I and rejecting the
Victims' request for an extension of the time limit for the submission of observations in the appeal.
10.
On 4 January 2010, and after having been granted victim status by Pre-Trial Chamber 1,22 the Victims filed
the "Second Request for Participation and Observations on the Prosecution's Appeal against the Decision on the
Application for a Warrant for the Arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir" 2 (hereinafter: "Second Victims'
Request for Participation"). On 6 January 2010, the Appeals Chamber issued an order, setting a time limit for
the submission of a response by the Prosecutor to the Second Victims' Request for Participation.2 4 The Prosecutor
responded to the Second Victims' Request for Participation on 11 January 201025 (hereinafter: "Prosecutor's
Response to Second Victims' Request").
11.
On 28 January 2010, the Appeals Chamber granted the Victims the right to participate in the present appeal
and allowed the substantive submissions made in the Second Victims' Request for Participation. 26
III.

MERITS
A.

12.

Relevant part of the Impugned Decision

In the Impugned Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated:
The Prosecution highlights that it relies exclusively on proof by inference to substantiate its
allegations concerning Omar Al Bashir's alleged responsibility for genocide. In particular, the
Prosecution relies on inferences to prove the existence of Omar Al Bashir's dolus specialis/specific
intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups. 27

13.

The Pre-Trial Chamber described the standard of proof that it would apply in such a situation as follows:
158. In applying the law on the proof by inference to the article 58 evidentiary standard in relation
to the existence of a GoS's genocidal intent, the Majority agrees with the Prosecution in that such
a standard would be met only if the materials provided by the Prosecution in support of the
Prosecution Application show that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom is the
existence of reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of a GoS's dolus specialis/specific
intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups.
159. As a result, the Majority considers that, if the existence of a GoS's genocidal intent is only
one of several reasonable conclusions available on the materials provided by the Prosecution, the
Prosecution Application in relation to genocide must be rejected as the evidentiary standard provided
for in article 58 of the Statute would not have been met. 28

14.
The Pre-Trial Chamber assessed the evidence presented by the Prosecutor against the standard developed
in paragraphs 158 and 159 of the Impugned Decision 29 and concluded that "the materials provided by the
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Prosecution in support of the Prosecution Application fail to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the GoS
acted with dolus specialis/specific intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, and
consequently no warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir shall be issued in relation to [the crime of genocide]".30
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

15.
Judge Ugacka filed a separate and partly dissenting opinion to the Impugned Decision 3' (hereinafter:
"Dissenting Opinion"). She underlined that the Statute provides for an increasingly demanding evidentiary threshold
from the arrest warrant stage to conviction. 32 She disagreed with the test adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber, stating
that it was "tantamount to requiring the Prosecution to present sufficient evidence to allow the Chamber to be
convinced of genocidal intent beyond a reasonable doubt". 33 In her view, it is sufficient that the inference of
genocidal intent be a reasonable one, but it is not necessary that it be the only reasonable conclusion based on
the evidence. 34 Judge Ugacka assessed the evidence presented by the Prosecutor and concluded that the existence
of genocidal intent was indeed a reasonable conclusion. 35 In her opinion, the Pre-Trial Chamber should have issued
a warrant of arrest in respect of genocide. 36
C.

Arguments of the Prosecutor

16.
In his Document in Support of the Appeal, the Prosecutor submits that he proved the genocidal intent of
Mr Al Bashir before the Pre-Trial Chamber.-7 He argues that the Pre-Trial Chamber incorrectly required that
genocidal intent be the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn on the basis of the evidence. 38 In the Prosecutor's
view, the Pre-Trial Chamber "effectively required proof of an inference beyond reasonable doubt in order to
establish 'reasonable grounds to believe' under Article 58" .39 The Prosecutor submits that article 58 of the Statute
does not require that "a conclusion be the only reasonable conclusion. Nor is this a generic requirement for proof
by inference at all stages". 40 The Prosecutor notes that although the Pre-Trial Chamber explained in the Decision
Granting Leave that it had not required proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Chamber failed to explain why it
nevertheless required that genocidal intent be the only reasonable conclusion.41 In the view of the Prosecutor, this
amounted to the imposition of an incorrect two-stage test.42 The Prosecutor also contends that the Pre-Trial Chamber
"implicitly acknowledged" that the inference of Mr Al Bashir's genocidal intent was reasonable. 43
17.
The Prosecutor emphasises that at the arrest warrant stage, he is not required to present his full case, but
must meet only the lowest standard of proof set out in the Statute.44 In his submission, this threshold is met if
the evidence provides "reasonable (not conclusive or definitive) grounds to believe that the person committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court". 45 He recalls that the Statute does not differentiate between various
categories of evidence and that the test should not be different for circumstantial evidence than for direct evidence;
in his view, the Court has to assess the circumstantial evidence to determine whether the requisite standard of
proof is met.46 He underlines that there will rarely be direct evidence of a person's state of mind.4 7
To support his argument that the Pre-Trial Chamber's standard was erroneous, the Prosecutor refers to
18.
previous practices of this Court. He underlines that in relation to other cases, Pre-Trial Chamber I has never
required that the existence of a mental element of a crime be the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
the evidence. 48 He submits that requiring such proof might actually endan er witnesses, and that it is impossible
at this stage of the proceedings to obtain proof beyond reasonable doubt.W
19.
Finally, the Prosecutor refers the Appeals Chamber to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals,50 of the European Court of Human Rights, 5 ' and to national practice, 52 emphasising that none of these
jurisdictions require at the arrest warrant stage that the existence of reasonable grounds to believe be the only
reasonable conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the evidence.
20.
As to the relief sought, the Prosecutor submits that the Appeals Chamber should, on the basis of the factual
findings made by the Pre-Trial Chamber, make a determination that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
Mr Al Bashir has committed genocide, and should remand the matter to the Pre-Trial Chamber "with direction
to authorize the arrest of President Al Bashir for genocide".' The Prosecutor contends that the factual findings
of the Pre-Trial Chamber support reasonable grounds to believe Mr Al Bashir committed the crime of genocide. 54
The Prosecutor submits that the A Weals Chamber has the power to make factual determinations, as long as it has
before it the relevant information. In the alternative, he requests that the Appeals Chamber should remand the
matter to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a new decision. 56

928

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS

D.

[VOL. 49:

Observations of the SWTUF and the SIDG and response of the Prosecutor thereto

21.
The SWTUF and the SIDG submit that the Pre-Trial Chamber did not err when rejecting the Prosecutor's
Arrest Warrant Application in respect of the crime of genocide.57 They underline that article 58 of the Statute
stipulates that the Pre-Trial Chamber must be "satisfied" that reasonable grounds to believe exist, and that both
the Pre-Trial Chamber and Judge Ugacka in her dissenting opinion noted that this standard was the test to be
applied.58 The SWTUF and SIDG accept that a different standard of proof applies at the trial level.59 However,
in their view, the Pre-Trial Chamber must be certain that the standard of reasonable grounds to believe is met,
failing which the Chamber would not be "satisfied" of the standardi 0 To support their submission, the SWTUF
and the SIDG refer the Appeals Chamber to previous jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chambers. 6 1
22.
The SWTUF and the SIDG submit furthermore that the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the Prosecutor had
not presented sufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds to believe regarding genocidal intent.62 The
SWTUF and SIDG recall that throughout the Impugned Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to the correct
standard under article 58 of the Statute. 63 They also emphasise that the divergence of views between the Pre-Trial
Chamber and Judge Ugacka is one that relates to the assessment of the evidence and the conclusions drawn
therefrom, but not to the standard itself.M
23.
The SWTUF and the SIDG submit that the Prosecutor is incorrect when he argues that the Pre-Trial Chamber
implicitly accepted that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Al Bashir had genocidal intent. 65 They
refer the Appeals Chamber to the Pre-Trial Chamber's analysis of the evidence in the Impugned Decision,
underlining that the Pre-Trial Chamber did not make a finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe
genocidal intent existed.6 7
24.
As to the appropriate relief, the SWTUF and the SIDG argue that the only issue on appeal is whether the
Pre-Trial Chamber applied the correct evidentiary test when rejecting the Prosecutor's Arrest Warrant Application
in respect of genocide,6 8 but not whether the Pre-Trial Chamber analysed the evidence correctly.6 9 In their view,
if the Appeals Chamber were to conclude that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in respect of the standard of proof,
the matter should be remanded to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a new decision. 70 They argue that the Appeals Chamber
carmot overturn the Pre-Trial Chamber's finding without itself assessing all the evidence fully.7 1
25.
The Prosecutor refutes the submissions of the SWTUF and the SIDG, repeating many of the arguments
raised in his Document in Support of the Appeal. He emphasises that article 58 (1) of the Statute does not require
that there be "absolute certainty that the evidence exclude all hypotheses inconsistent with the requisite statutory
elements of the alleged crime, [because] then the lower threshold showing of 'reasonable grounds' would be
meaningless". 72 The Prosecutor submits that the SWTUF and SIDG do not refer to any authority to support their
view that a Pre-Trial Chamber must be certain that the standard of reasonable grounds is met, otherwise the
Chamber would not be "satisfied" of the standard.73 The Prosecutor insists that both the Impugned Decision and
the Observations are logically flawed because they are based on the premise that reasonable grounds can only
exist if they are the only reasonable conclusion, 74 and that the "only reasonable conclusion" standard is the
"logical equivalent" of the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard.75
26.
The Prosecutor rejects the argument that the Pre-Trial Chamber and Judge Ugacka in her Dissenting Opinion
agreed on the standard and merely assessed the evidence differently, submitting that under the Pre-Trial Chamber's
standard a reasonable inference would not be sufficient to establish reasonable grounds to believe. 76 Finally, the
Prosecutor submits that the argument that the Appeals Chamber cannot overtum a factual finding by the Pre-Trial
Chamber unless it assesses all evidence itself is misconstrued in the context of the present appeal.
E.

Submissions of the Victims and response of the Prosecutor thereto

27.
The Victims generally support the Prosecutor's arguments on appeal.7 8 In their view, the Pre-Trial Chamber
developed a standard of proof that was "unduly stringent", and which was neither supported by the wording or
intent of the Statute nor by precedent. 79 The Victims submit that the Pre-Trial Chamber's standard did not provide
the flexibility required during the investigation stage of the proceedings.8 0 They refer the Appeals Chamber to
decisions of the Intemational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter: "ICTY"), which reflect
a lower standard of proof,8 1 and which even indicate that the mental element does not have to be established at
the pre-trial stage of proceedings at the ICTY. 82 The Victims are of the view that the Pre-Trial Chamber was
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"involving itself in an overly critical evaluation of the evidence". 83 The Victims request that the matter be remitted
to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a new evaluation of the evidence, in the course of which the Chamber should also
take into account information supplied by two of the Victims. 84
28.
The Prosecutor supports the submissions of the Victims, noting that the Victims endorse the submissions
he has made in the Document in Support of the Appeal.85 As to the Victims' request that the Pre-Trial Chamber
should take into account the information provided by two of the Victims when evaluating anew the Prosecutor's
evidence regarding genocidal intent, the Prosecutor notes that the present ap eal is confined to a "precise legal
matter", and that the Victims' submissions therefore should be disregarded.
F.
29.

Determination by the Appeals Chamber

Article 58 (1) of the Statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
At any time after the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application
of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having examined the application and
the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; and
(b)[ ...
]1

30.
In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the evidentiary threshold of "reasonable grounds to believe" for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest must be distinguished from the threshold required for the confirmation of charges
("substantial grounds to believe", article 61 (7) of the Statute) and the threshold for a conviction ("beyond
reasonable doubt", article 66 (3) of the Statute). It is evident from the wording of the provisions that the standards
of "substantial grounds to believe" and "beyond reasonable doubt" are higher standards of proof than "reasonable
grounds to believe". Accordingly, when disposing of an application for a warrant of arrest under article 58 (1)
of the Statute, a Pre-Trial Chamber should not require a level of proof that would be required for the confirmation
of charges or for conviction.
The Appeals Chamber notes that the Pre-Trial Chamber equated87 the "reasonable grounds to believe"
31.
standard with the "reasonable suspicion" standard as a prerequisite for lawful arrest or detention under article 5
(1) (c) of the European Convention on Human Rights.8 8 In this context it is instructive to recall that the European
Court of Human Rights has interpreted "reasonable suspicion" under article 5 (1) (c) of the European Convention
on Human Rights as "presuppos[ing] the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective
observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence". 89 Thus, at this preliminary stage, it does
not have to be certain that that person committed the alleged offence. Certainty as to the commission of the crime
is required only at the trial stage of the proceedings (see article 66 (3) of the Statute), when the Prosecutor has
had a chance to submit more evidence.
32.
In the Impugned Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber developed a specific test to determine whether "reasonable
grounds to believe" have been established by way of "proof by inference". The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that
the "reasonable grounds" standard would be met (and a warrant would be issued) if the evidence provided by
the Prosecutor "show[s] that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom is the existence of reasonable
grounds to believe in the existence" of the requisite specific genocidal intent.90 The Chamber further explained
its understanding of the applicable standard as follows:
[I]f the existence of [...] genocidal intent is only one of several reasonable conclusions available
on the materials provided by the Prosecution, the Prosecution Application in relation to genocide
must be rejected as the evidentiary standard provided for in article 58 of the Statute would not
have been met. 9 1
33.
In the view of the Appeals Chamber, requiring that the existence of genocidal intent must be the only
reasonable conclusion amounts to requiring the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to
eliminate any reasonable doubt. If the only reasonable conclusion based on the evidence is the existence of
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genocidal intent, then it cannot be said that such a finding establishes merely "reasonable grounds to believe".
Rather, it establishes genocidal intent "beyond reasonable doubt".
34.
The Pre-Trial Chamber not only developed an erroneous standard regarding "proof by inference," but
actually applied this standard to the evidence put forward by the Prosecutor in respect of Mr Al Bashir's alleged
genocidal intent. Notably, in paragraph 195 of the Impugned Decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that:
[T]here are a number of additional factors, resulting from the materials provided by the Prosecution,
that must be taken into consideration in determining whether the existence of reasonable grounds
to believe that the GoS acted with genocidal intent is the only reasonable conclusion from the
commission by GoS forces, in a widespread and systematic manner, of the above-mentioned war
crimes and crimes against humanity. 92
35.
The "number of additional factors" to be considered by the Pre-Trial Chamber were subsequently evaluated
in paragraphs 196 to 200 of the Impugned Decision.
36.

The Pre-Trial Chamber summed up its analysis of the Prosecutor's evidence as follows:
204. In this regard, the Majority recalls that the above-mentioned analysis of the Prosecution's
allegations concerning the GoS's genocidal intent and its supporting materials has led the Majority
to make the following findings:
i. even if the existence of an alleged GoS strategy to deny and conceal the crimes committed
in Darfur was to be proven, there can be a variety of plausible reasons for its adoption,
including the intention to conceal the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity;
ii. the Prosecution's allegations concerning the alleged insufficient resources allocated by the
GoS to ensure adequate conditions of life in IDP Camps in Darfur are vague in light of the
fact that, in addition to the Prosecution's failure to provide any specific information as to what
possible additional resources could have been provided by the GoS, there existed an ongoing
armed conflict at the relevant time and the number of IDPS s, according to the United Nations,
was as high as two million by mid 2004, and as high as 2.7 million today;
iii. the materials submitted by the Prosecution in support of the Prosecution Application reflect
a situation within the IDP Camps which significantly differs from the situation described by
the Prosecution in the Prosecution Application;
iv. the materials submitted by the Prosecution in support of the Prosecution Application reflect
a level of GoS hindrance of medical and humanitarian assistance in IDP Camps in Darfur which
significantly differs from that described by the Prosecution in the Prosecution Application;
v. despite the particular seriousness of those war crimes and crimes against humanity that
appeared to have been committed by GoS forces in Darfuir between 2003 and 2008, a number
of materials provided by the Prosecution point to the existence of several factors indicating
that the commission of such crimes can reasonably be explained by reasons other than the
existence of a GoS's genocidal intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa groups;
vi. the handful of GoS official statements (including three allegedly made by Omar Al Bashir
himself) and public documents relied upon by the Prosecution provide only indicia of a GoS's
persecutory intent (as opposed to a genocidal intent) against the members of the Fur, Masalit
and Zaghawa groups; and
vii. as shown by the Prosecution's allegations in the case of The Prosecutorv. Ahmad Harun
and All Kushayb, the Prosecution has not found any indicia of genocidal intent on the part of
Ahmad Harun, in spite of the fact that the harsher language contained in the above-mentioned
GoS official statements and documents comes allegedly from him.93
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The Pre-Trial Chamber stated:
[W]hen all materials provided by the Prosecution in support of the Prosecution Application are
analysed together, and consequently, the above-mentioned findings are jointly assessed, the Majority
cannot but conclude that the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the GoS acted with
[genocidal] intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups is not the
only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn therefrom. 94

38.

Based on this conclusion, the Pre-Trial Chamber found "that the materials provided by the Prosecution

[...] fail to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the GoS acted with [genocidal intent] [...], and consequently

no warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir shall be issued in relation to [genocide] counts 1 to 3"

.95

39.
The above indicates that the Pre-Trial Chamber would be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to
believe that Mr Al Bashir acted with genocidal intent only if the existence of such intent was the only reasonable
conclusion. The Appeals Chamber finds that, although the Pre-Trial Chamber appreciated the appropriate standard
to be "reasonable grounds to believe",96 it applied this standard erroneously. The standard it developed and
applied in relation to "proof by inference" was higher and more demanding than what is required under article
58 (1) (a) of the Statute. This amounted to an error of law.
IV.

APPROPRIATE RELIEF

On an appeal under article 82 (1) (d) of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber may confirm, reverse or amend
40.
the decision appealed (rule 158 (1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
In the instant case, the Pre-Trial Chamber applied an erroneous standard of proof when evaluating the
41.
evidence submitted by the Prosecutor and, consequently, rejected his application for a warrant of arrest in respect
of the crime of genocide. Therefore, the decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber not to issue a warrant of arrest in
respect of that crime was materially affected by an error of law. It is therefore appropriate to reverse the Impugned
Decision to that extent.
42.
The Appeals Chamber notes that the Prosecutor has requested the Appeals Chamber to "apply the correct
standard to the facts found by the Pre-Trial Chamber, entering a finding that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that President Omar Al Bashir is criminally responsible for genocide". 97 He also requests the Appeals
Chamber to "direct the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue a warrant of arrest on those counts". 98 The Appeals Chamber
is of the view that the substance of the matter should be considered by the Pre-Trial Chamber, and not by the
Appeals Chamber. Therefore, the matter is remanded to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a new decision, using the
correct standard of proof.
Done in both English and French, the English version being authoritative.
Judge Erkki Kourula
Presiding Judge
Dated this

3 rd

day of February 2010

At The Hague, The Netherlands
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